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Introduction
Russia is a state that enjoys diverse climatic, geographic, economic, cultural and historical condi-
tions. As a result, people living in various regions have different preferences for public goods, while 
the federal center cannot effectively identify priorities for the population of each region. These are 
the arguments in favor of a highly  decentralized governance of the public sector in Russia. On the 
other hand, the Russian regions vary considerably in terms of tax base and fiscal capacity. Great 
disparity in economic situation of the regions calls for the federal center to reallocate financial re-
sources. The reallocation function of the budgetary system becomes even more important owing to 
the uneven economic growth of Russian regions and changes in their population sizes in the 
medium-term perspective. 
The combination of arguments in favor and against decentralization requires from the long-term 
intergovernmental fiscal policy  to be flexible enough to provide for a minimum level of public 
service financing in depressive regions and, at the same time, to stimulate economic growth in re-
gions and municipalities demonstrating dynamic development. In order to achieve the optimal bal-
ance between the two goals it is necessary  to accomplish a set of tasks including both a better as-
signment of expenditure responsibilities across the federal center, regions and municipalities and an 
improved allocation of revenue sources across the different tiers of government. At the same time, 
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the structure of the IGFR equalization system should not create soft budgetary constraints. It  also 
should minimize negative fiscal stimuli on the part of subnational authorities.  
Historical Overview
The Constitution of the Russian Federation (dated 1993) provides  for a list of exclusive responsi-
bilities of the federation and a list of joint responsibilities of the federation and the subjects of the 
federation (here I will refer to them as regions).  The list of joint responsibilities contains only  gen-
eral  government functions (such as “education”, “healthcare” or “welfare”) without further break-
down into primary, secondary, and higher education or into first aid, ambulance, general and spe-
cialized healthcare.
In the 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet socialist system with its centralized government, the 
division of spending responsibilities between the federal center and regional governments followed 
the allocation of property rights on public institutions to be financed by federal or regional authori-
ties rather  than the division of service delivery functions.  Thus, some kindergartens were run and 
financed by the federal government, while others - by regional and municipal governments. On the 
other hand, the universities could be owned and run by  any level of government. The same applied 
to any other government function: the obligation to perform a function was substituted by the obli-
gation to provide adequate spending to  a public institution assigned to a specific government body. 
Revenues of a particular government depended  fully  on the amount of expenditures  it needed to 
finance its public institutions. The allocation of revenues across regional governments  remained the 
privilege of the federal government. It was also the federal government that introduced or withdrew 
taxes (including those  retained by a regional or a local government) and collected all the taxes. Re-
gional and local governments had only  the right to change tax rates (within federal limits) of a 
number of  regional and local taxes which could  cover less than 10% of their total expenditures. 
The rest was funded through shared federal taxes and gap-filling cash transfers.
The major shared taxes in the 1990s  were the personal and corporate income taxe and the VAT. The 
federal government was sharing these taxes with regional governments on the origin-based princi-
ple which means that a regional government was permitted to retain a  certain share of taxes gener-
ated by taxpayers registered  in that region. Before 1994,  shares  were set individually for  each 
region and changed every  year. Individual shares of federal taxes were subject to negotiations be-
tween the federal and regional governments.
All the standards of service delivery were  prescribed by the federal legislation and appeared in the 
federal legislation as unfunded federal mandates. The greatest burden for regional governments 
were child allowances and in kind benefits to war veterans, invalids and other eligible groups of 
citizens  (including, by the way, federal government officials like policemen, judges, the military). 
The benefits consisted  mostly of free or low-price provision of housing and utilities services and 
free public transportation.
Because both tax revenues and spending responsibilities were assigned to each region by the federal 
government, the amount of an equalization (or rather gap-filling) transfer was calculated as the dif-
ference between estimated tax revenues and estimated spending needs. Both estimates  regarding a 
particular region were negotiated between the federal Ministry of Finance and the relevant regional 
government. When calculating transfers the Ministry of Finance takes into account  consolidated 
revenues and expenditures of  a region, which means  revenues and expenditures of the regional 
government together with those of all municipalities in its jurisdiction. 
Components of the IGFR Reform
Starting from 2000, Russia went through a period of a radical reform of intergovernmental fiscal 
relations. The results of the reform were as follows:
• the budgetary system of the RF subjects has become more transparent,
• powers and expenditure responsibilities have been delineated between the federal, regional 
and local governments, 
• stable revenue sources have been assigned to each level of government,
• intergovernmental transfers both to regional and local governments have been designed ac-
cording to formula,  
• regional and local finance management has improved.
This reform included the following four components:
The first component of the IGFR reform: 
Clear and symmetrical allocation of spending responsibilities across federal, regional and local 
governments. 
Functions assigned to regional governments:
providing funds to municipalities for pre-school, primary, secondary and 
after school education 
vocational education
specialized hospitals (TB, cancer, psycho etc.) 
construction and maintenance of regional roads and other infrastructure 
welfare services to elderly and handicapped 
children allowances, allowances to victims of Stalin’s regime and low 
income households
orphanages 
regional public libraries
cultural and sport events 
environment and nature reserves protection
inter-city public transportation 
regional museums
veterinary control 
terrorism  control
intergovernmental relations with local self-
governments
This also included demarcation of joint responsibilities. Now each level of government is responsi-
ble not for funding a specific public institution but for provision of particular public service to its 
population.
Though the Constitution has not been changed, the new federal legislation provides for a more de-
tailed list of functions to be performed by  regional and local governments. 
The second component of the IGFR reform: 
Distinction between the three types of responsibilities:
1)  regulate (or set standards for)  public service delivery  responsibility, 
2)  provide adequate funding for this service delivery,
3)  deliver the service itself.
This distinction permitted to get rid of unfunded federal mandates. From now on the detailed  serv-
ice delivery  regulation  and  the responsibility  to provide  adequate funding for these purposes must 
remain at  the same level of government (either federal, regional or municipal). The service delivery 
function may be transferred to  a lower level of government but only together with the special pur-
pose (or strictly conditional) grant or transfer.
To a certain extent, the elimination of unfunded mandates was  executed through funding of previ-
ously unfunded federal mandates. To provide adequate funding for mandates (from now on - func-
tions delegated to the regional level2), the federation concentrated additional revenues in the federal 
budget.   It was done   by reducing regional shares in federal taxes. These revenues are  transferred 
2 Mostly subsidies and benefits to war veterans and Chernobyl victims
back to regions  as special purpose transfers. Because the functions are  delegated symmetrically  to 
all regions,  special purpose transfers also go to every regional government,  whether it  is wealthy 
or poor. 
Another way  of unfunded federal mandates elimination was a considerable reduction  in regional 
competences extensive regulating  on the part of the  federal center. . From now on the federal leg-
islation can only set  a framework regulation of regional competences while  detailed standards are 
to be set by regional laws. To introduce this change, the Russian National Parliament had to adopt 
amendments to about 200 federal laws. Among the  abolished federal mandates the major one   con-
cerned federal regulation of regional and municipal public employees’ wages. Now each region is 
free to set its own wage rates for teachers, doctors, government officials etc.
 
As the RF Constitution does not permit to reduce, over time, the amount or the quality of public 
services, regional governments appear not to be fully  free in setting their own standards of functions 
transferred to them from the federal level. As a consequence, the federal unfunded mandates con-
tinue to exist.
                     Taxes assigned to regions:
- regional corporate property tax 
- regional tax on car owners
- regional tax on gambling business
- 73% share of federal corporate income tax collected within the 
region (regions may vary its rate within 4% points)
- 70% share of federal personal income tax collected within the 
region
- 100% share of federal excises on liquor, wine and beer
- 50% share of federal excises on technical 
alcohol 
- 60% share of federal excises on gasoline and 
diesel fuel
- 5% share of federal oil and gas extraction tax
- 60% share of federal other minerals extraction 
tax
- 100% share of federal tax on inheritance and 
gifts
- 90% share of federal single tax levied under  
the  simplified taxation system
- 30% of federal single agricultural tax
The third component of the IGFR reform: 
Symmetric assignment of revenues across the levels of government and fixing equal shares of fed-
eral taxes to regions on the permanent basis. 
The assignment of taxing powers and shares of shared taxes across the levels of government fol-
lowed the assignment of spending obligations. The quantitative assessment of transferred responsi-
bilities from one level of government to another permitted to estimates the needs for financial re-
sources of each level of government. Accordingly, regional and local governments received the 
power to set rates (within federal limits) on a prescribed number of taxes and were guaranteed the 
right to retain equal (across each sub-national level) shares of  specific federal taxes collected 
within their borders. 
The fourth component of the IGFR reform: 
Introduction of a formula based vertical equalization mechanism.
Each regional government with below the national average fiscal capacity  is eligible for an equali-
zation transfer from the federal budget. The vast discrepancy in per capita tax revenues results in 
the fact  that 75% of Russian regions fall into this category.  The total amount of the equalizing fund 
constitutes about 6-7% of federal budget expenditures (or 1% of GDP). 
The size of a transfer to a particular region depends on the region’s fiscal capacity and  the gap  be-
tween it and the national average. The transfer formula takes into account only official statistical 
data collected independently, with no influence on the part of regional or federal authorities. The 
regional tax capacity  estimate is based on per capita Gross Regional Product data.  The per capita 
tax capacity is then adjusted for regional differences in costs of public service provision..  Introduc-
tion of this objective transfer formula has put an end to negotiations between regional governments 
and the federal Ministry of Finance. Unfortunately, the Ministry  of Finance  introduces changes into 
the transfer formula every fiscal year, which results in unpredictability of the transfer amount due to 
every  region. 
Equalizing transfers constitute only half of intergovernmental transfers. The federal government 
provides regions with other types of financial assistance, such as  matching grants for implementing 
federal welfare policy, transfers for investments in public infrastructure and transfers compensating 
regional losses due to reassignment of functions and revenues across the levels of government. 
These transfers are much less transparent and are often used by the federal government as instru-
ments  to interfere into regional affairs. 
Composition of Regional Revenues
In FY 2005, an average Russian region (regional plus municipal governments) was only 15% dependent on federal transfers. 
Another 35% of its revenues were shared federal taxes, about 30% – the corporate income tax (where regional government can 
manipulate tax rate), about 10% – regional and municipal taxes, and about 10% – revenues from market sales of goods and 
services.  
Nevertheless, in poorer regions the share of federal transfers  goes up  to 80% of their revenues. Still,  fiscal equaliza-
tion permits to reduce regional per capita revenue gap from 80 fold to only  12 fold and to bring the poorest region from 13% of the 
national average to 60%. The richest region exceeds the national average after equalization by 4.5 fold because horizontal equali-
zation does not include negative transfers from richer regions in favor of poorer ones.
Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations between Regional Governments and Municipalities
The intergovernmental fiscal reform in Russia was coupled with the reform of local self- govern-
ance. The new federal law (2003) introduced two levels of local self-governance including (i) mu-
nicipal raions (districts) and  (ii) municipal urban  and rural settlements (small towns or villages). 
Bigger (municipal) cities represent the third type of local self- governance combining functions 
(and revenues) assigned by  the federal law both to settlements and to raions.  The total number of 
municipalities in Russia exceeds 24,000.  Federal cities, i.e.  Moscow and St.  Petersburg, have the 
right to issue their own regulations on organization of local self-governance within their boundaries. 
Functions assigned to municipal raions:
Own functions:
- inter-village electricity and gas supply; 
- inter-village public transportation;
- construction and maintenance of inter-village 
roads;
- municipal police;
- environment protection;
- general hospitals, maternity care and ambulance;
- raion libraries;
- recreation, cultural and sport events;
- waste utilization.
Delegated functions funded by region:
- pre-school, primary, secondary education,  sup-
plementary after classes education;  
- birth, death and marriages  registration.
Taxes assigned to municipal raions:
- 20% share of personal income tax
- 90% share of federal single tax on imputed income
- 30% share of federal single agricultural tax
Functions assigned to municipal settlements:
- electricity, heating, water, gas , and fuel supply; 
- construction and maintenance of municipal housing 
(for low income households);
- city/village libraries;
- basic fire protection;
- street lights;
- public transportation within city/village;
- recreation, cultural and sport events;
- cemeteries;
- waste collection;
- city/village road construction and maintenance; 
- parks and gardens;
- teenagers’ recreation.
Taxes assigned to municipal settlements:
- municipal land tax
- municipal personal property tax 
- 10% share of personal income tax
- 30% share of federal single agricultural tax
The federal law strictly defines the scope of local self-governance, although regional governments 
may delegate to local governments some of regional functions together with resources to perform 
them.  
The share of  intergovernmental transfers in local revenues varies from about 30 to 80 %. 
The federal legislation allows regions to use the same kinds of transfers as the federal government 
is using when providing financial assistance to regions. The equalization algorithm is up to regions, 
though the federal legislation provides for a number of regulations.  It requires  from regional gov-
ernments to allocate their equalization transfers to municipalities based on per capita fiscal capaci-
ties. In reality, however, regions customarily  equalize local governments’ capacities to maintain the 
existing social infrastructure.  For instance, education expenditure needs are estimated by the num-
ber of schools and teachers, rather than by the number of schoolchildren.  Regions may choose to 
allocate grants from the regional pool to all municipalities (i.e., municipal raions, municipal cities 
and municipal settlements) directly or use a two-step  procedure (i.e., equalize municipal raions and 
urban districts from the regional level and then allow raions equalize settlements).  The majority of 
the regions are using the second approach (popular earlier ) because it means less  effort.  
The Sub-national Debt Issue
Currently, the regional excessive debt issue  does not seem to be a problem in Russia. There are at 
least two reasons for this. First, following  the 1998 financial crisis  when a number of regions 
found themselves on the edge of bankruptcy, very severe limits on regional borrowing and debt 
amounts were included into the federal legislation. The allowed debt was not  to exceed  a regional 
government’s own revenues, and the allowed deficit  was not to exceed 15 % of regions’ own reve-
nues exclusive of proceeds from sales of property.  Another reason for the low level of regional debt 
is the world oil price hike  that increased regions’ tax revenues and permitted them to finance about 
half of investments from own current revenues. The second largest  source  of all subnational public 
investments are federal capital transfers (25%). Only 1.6 % of subnational investments are financed 
with bank loans.  Increase in bond-related liabilities covers 13 % of subnational investments and 
proceeds from sales of regional/local assets add another 8 %.  
As a result, since the end of the 1990s regional governments’ debt burden has  continued to   reduce 
to constitute today  less then 2% of the GDP. The ratio of the consolidated regional debt to regional 
budget spending constitutes 15%. The City of Moscow whose spending accounts for roughly  20% 
of total regional government spending  is responsible for the bulk (25%) of the total regional gov-
ernments’ debt. 
The federal Ministry of Finance carefully monitors the debt and deficit  parameters of regional gov-
ernments and is planning to pass an insolvency  law that would require  implementation of emer-
gency  financial management controls in case the debt limit is exceeded.  
It should be noted that that the officially  reported figures on regional governments’ debt and budget 
deficit are estimated on the cash basis and do not take into account  accrued liabilities. Public em-
ployee wage arrears carried over from previous years  and/or overdue debts of  public enterprises 
(accounts payable), though  not shown in  budget execution reports,  still constitute in some regions 
a sizable share  of regional governments’ liabilities. Thus sub-national wage arrears in mid and late 
1990-ies increased 2 % of GDP but recently, due to a favorable economic situation, have shrunk to 
0.01 % of GDP.
 
